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I. INTRODUCTION:
The right to leave one's country and pursue a new life else-
where has been recognized in various international treaties and is
almost universally honored.1 Countries that restrict the ability of
* J. D. Candidate 2008, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. in Politics &
Latin American Studies 2005, New York University. This article is dedicated to my
parents whose lives spent in public service have inspired me to pursue a career
serving the underrepresented. I would like to thank Professor JoNel Newman for her
invaluable mentorship and instruction and Professor David Abraham for his
thoughtful comments and generous guidance in writing this article.
1. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). The Declaration does not
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their citizens to leave are criticized for human rights violations,
and have historically been the subject of trade embargoes or hos-
tile diplomatic relations.2 However, while most nations are quick
to criticize other nations for restrictive emigration policies, there
has never been widespread international recognition of a corre-
sponding right to immigrate. Thus, the citizen wishing to leave
his country faces quite a conundrum: almost all nations support
his right to leave, but virtually no country is willing to accept him.
Most countries refuse to recognize such a right on the basis of sov-
ereignty; a government must maintain control over immigration
policies because the regulation of a nation's border and its right to
restrict who enters it are issues at the very heart of a nation's
autonomy. 3 In general, national governments will only acknowl-
edge an obligation to accept individuals into their country if the
government is a signatory to an international treaty governing the
rights of refugees fleeing their homes in fear of persecution.
Therefore, the "universal right to leave" one's country appears to
be little more than a political statement; little effort is actually
undertaken to bring to fruition a person's right to leave.
This comment will explore how a nation's sovereign right to
exclude conflicts with the implied right of immigration as set forth
in international documents such as the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.4 If a person has a right to emigrate
from his country, he must have a right to go somewhere. How-
ever, with a few exceptions, virtually no nation openly recognizes
include a universal right to immigrate, but rather a right to emigrate; however, the
right to leave arguably implies a right to immigrate somewhere-a point to be
discussed extensively, infra pp. 23-32.
2. In addition to open criticism of nations that restrict the right of their citizens
to leave, see, e.g. President Reagan's Proclamation of Human Rights Day, infra p. 14,
note 60, the United States has instituted trade sanctions against countries interfering
with the right to emigrate. See Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2432.
There has also been international effort to censure countries that restrict emigration
through exposure. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains
a provision that requires signatory countries to periodically submit reports on the
observance of the Covenant's human rights provisions. See International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res., 2200A (XXI) 21st Sess., (Dec. 16, 1966). See
also ALAN DowTY: CLOSED BORDERS, THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT 214-221 (Yale University Press, 1987) (discussing the effects of the
reporting requirements on nations that had historically restricted the right to
emigrate).
which requires countries to submit reports
3. The United States Supreme Court first articulated the constitutionality of
restrictions on immigration on the basis of sovereignty in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), better known as The Chinese Exclusion Case.
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, at art. 13.
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such a universal right. Rather, most nations defend the right to
restrict who may cross over their borders. Yet, the language used
in international treaties endorsing the right to emigrate does not
restrict it-the citizen's right to leave his home country is not
dependent upon another country's accepting him-he has the
right to leave by virtue of being human.5 Of course this does not
mean that a future world with "open borders"6 where citizens are
classified not by nationality, but rather viewed as "world citizens,"
is very likely. In fact such a view is arguably an idealistic, if not
illusory vision. Nevertheless, it is important to note that there
have been some open concessions of autonomy by nations. Recog-
nition of a right to asylum or entrance under refugee status repre-
sents a voluntary relinquishment of a sovereign's right to exclude;
in such instances a nation submits to international law-a body
of law whose legitimacy is frequently questioned.
Therefore, international acknowledgment of a right to asylum
or refugee status is significant. Whenever a country submits to
international law, it admits to the existence of laws (or at the very
least norms) created not by a democratic majority or a sovereign
head of state within that country, but rather by a number of
nations voluntarily limiting their own actions for the benefit of
international relations. In the context of immigration, the right of
asylum comes not from a national government, but from agree-
ment among various nations who agree to honor this right.' In
sum, international acceptance of a right to emigrate means that
5. For further explanation of the origin of the rights articulated in the
Declaration see the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra,
note 1 at pmbl.
6. For a discussion of the practical application of the "open borders" argument
focusing on the right to freedom of movement as a human right, see Joseph H. Carens,
A Reply to Meilaender: Reconsidering Open Borders, INT'L MIGRATION REVIEW, Vol. 33,
No. 4 (Winter 1999) at 1082-1097.
7. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 429(V), U.N. GAOR,
6th Sess., Supp. No. 19, Part II (July 28, 1951). The Convention was adopted in 1951
by the United Nations as an agreement among signatory parties governing the
treatment of regugees from World War II. Article 33 of the Convention, titled "The
Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ("Refoulement")" established a duty for member
countries: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion." Id. By limiting a nation's ability to reject refugees at
its borders, the Convention obligated a country to accept the refugee or at least find
another nation willing to accept him. Countries which agreed to this provision
necessarily relinquished the previously unfettered right to exclude in accordance with
international law.
8. See discussion supra, note 7.
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countries recognize a person's right to freedom of movement irre-
spective of the laws of his home-in essence, a right granted to
him solely because he is human.
This necessarily poses a question: if a person does not gain
the right to emigrate as a consequence of his citizenship, but
rather from recognition of the human right guaranteeing freedom
of movement out of respect for individual autonomy and the right
to freely decide where to live, must not a universal right to immi-
grate arise as a corollary of the right to emigrate for the same
reason? The quick answer offered by many, if not all, countries is
a resounding "no": however, such an answer should be qualified-
many countries have voluntarily accepted responsibility to care
for citizens of other countries pursuant to various international
agreements.
If a nation is willing to recognize obligations owed to foreign-
ers as a result of international law governing the treatment of ref-
ugees, could a more comprehensive right to immigrate emerge
from such voluntary forbearance of the sovereign's right to
exclude potential immigrants? Through an analysis of United
States immigration law, international support for a human right
to emigrate, and current regulation of asylum claims within the
United States I will investigate how the right to emigrate could be
expanded to include a right to immigrate. Because the large
majority of immigrants entering the United States today are com-
ing from points south-the Caribbean, and Central and South
America-I believe it is appropriate to focus on the effects of U.S.
immigration policy on Latin America. I will thus explore how cur-
rent U.S. law regulates immigration between the Northern and
Southern American hemispheres and how recognition of a right to
immigrate might affect Latin Americans seeking to immigrate to
the United States.
I will begin with an introduction to the political theory that
serves as the foundation for human rights theory and then give a
brief history of human rights developments in the twentieth cen-
9. A recent report from the U.S. Census Bureau dated May 10, 2006 confirmed
that Hispanics continue to be the largest minority group. See Press Release, U.S.
Census Bureau, Nation's Population One-Third Minority (10 May 2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/006808.html;
see also Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of America's
Foreign-Born Population in 2005, BACKGROUNDER (Center for Immigration Studies,
Washington, D.C.) Dec. 2005, at 9, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/
back1405.html (addressing the disproportional amount of immigrants entering the
United States from Latin America).
180
AN EMIGRANT'S RIGHT TO LEAVE
tury. I will demonstrate how the right to emigrate has emerged as
a universal human right through efforts in the arena of interna-
tional law. Section II will address current limitations on the right
to immigrate, and section III will show how nations have waived
their sovereign right to exclude by accepting refugees in accor-
dance with international norms. Finally, in section IV will explore
how a universal right to immigrate could emerge from existing
international obligations and the incorporation of human rights
norms into national immigration policy.
II. THE CONCEPT OF A RIGHT TO EMIGRATE
A. The Origin of a Universal Right to Freedom of
Movement
Human rights theory is founded upon the convergence of two
seemingly unrelated fields of law: legal theory and international
law. Philosophers such as John Locke and Jean Jacques Rous-
seau set forth philosophical theories on the rights of man and the
organization of governments during the Age of Reason and the
Enlightenment." Both Locke and Rousseau believed that each
person was endowed with "natural rights" upon birth, and that
these rights could only legitimately be restricted through volun-
tary concession." Their focus on individual worth and autonomy
forms the centerpiece of human rights theory, as the basic premise
rests upon the principle that all men are born with the same ina-
lienable rights.12 The theory behind human rights is also rooted in
international law in that universal human rights are made possi-
ble by individual nations' deference to international standards
that may restrict their sovereign powers. Applying this interpre-
tation to immigration, a universal right to emigrate emerges from
recognition of a natural right to freedom of movement, followed by
10. See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1690),
reprinted in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE (Paul E. Sigmund ed.,
W.W. Norton & Co. 2005); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762),
reprinted in ROUSSEAU: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS
(Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1997).
11. See LOCKE, supra note 10; ROUSSEAU, supra note 10.
12. At the heart of The International Bill of Human Rights which consists of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and its two Optional Protocols is the belief in "the inherent dignity
and. . .equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family." See
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, at pmbl.
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formal declarations by sovereign nations that they will protect
their citizens' right to freely exit and re-enter their home country.
The belief that a person is entitled to certain rights exclu-
sively due to his membership in the human race relies on the
assumption that an individual is born possessing rights. 3 To clar-
ify, certain rights (call them "natural") predate the formation of
society because they are not established by government, or even
organized society. This implies that prior to the formation of a
sovereign government, each individual had, at the very least, the
right of self-determination-the right to govern oneself. The
belief that human beings possessed rights upon birth demands
recognition that a person is entitled to certain rights as a result of
his being alive. That is, an individual enjoys certain rights which
are separate and distinct from those distributed by his govern-
ments. A further explanation of the political theory behind
human rights is necessary to demonstrate the link between natu-
ral rights, self-government, and international law.
According to John Locke, prior to the formation of govern-
ments all men exist equally in a state of nature: "a state of perfect
freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and
persons, as they think fit."'4 The only governing force within the
state of nature is self-governance. All men are born with the
capacity to reason and through it men are able to teach them-
selves to respect the rights of others so that their rights will be
respected equally." Since all human beings are supposedly born
into the same state of nature, they must share these same rights
of self-determination at birth; citizens across the globe should
enjoy the same liberties until they voluntarily enter into a society
which necessarily restricts their right to be free from all laws
other than the law of reason.16 In Locke's own words, "The only
way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and
puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to
13. While human rights theorists agree that everyone is entitled to certain rights
simply by virtue of being human, they argue over the source. Does a right arise from
human need, for example, the need for food, shelter, and affection? Or, are human
rights determined by society-what is necessary to live as a human being? The
second question implies that human rights are something more than a right to access
basic necessities. Perhaps, human rights define what it is to be human and therefore,
what human beings should be entitled to. For further discussion, see JACK DONNELLY,
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice 17 (Cornell University Press 1989).
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join and unite into a community. "17
In The Social Contract, Jean Jacques Rousseau further devel-
oped the idea of social contract theory."8 Rousseau's vision of the
state of nature is similar to that of Locke; men live rather solitary
lives, accompanied by family members if by anyone, and their
main focus is self-preservation. As a result, men owe no duties to
anyone other than themselves: "This common freedom is a conse-
quence of man's nature. His first law is to attend to his own pres-
ervation, his first cares are those which he owes to himself. . ."19
Therefore, upon birth, but before the construction of societies, the
only law which governed men was the law of self-preservation.
Like Locke, Rousseau believed that contract was the way out
of the state of nature. ° If men wanted an escape from the primi-
tive state of nature, they were free to enter into a society and then
form associations to create laws that would protect their own
rights and punish wrongdoers who violated the rights of others.
However, Rousseau emphasized that legitimate governments
could only be created through consent." The would-be citizens
had to voluntarily delegate the power to govern themselves to a
sovereign. Thus he labeled every "state that is ruled by laws" a
Republic.2 What is most important in Rousseau's theory of social
contract, and particularly applicable to the right to emigrate, is
his emphasis on the right of recission:
there is in the State no fundamental law that cannot be
revoked, not excluding the social compact itself; for if all
the citizens assembled of one accord to break the compact,
it is impossible to doubt that it would be very legitimately
broken... man can renounce his membership of his own
State, and recover his natural liberty and his goods on leav-
ing the country. It would be indeed absurd if all the citi-
zens in assembly could not do what each can do by
himself.23
Because governments are to be based upon the consent of the gov-
17. Id. at 58.
18. ROUSSEAU, supra note 10.
19. Id. at 42.
20. "Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no
right, we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority
among men." Id. at 44.
21. Conquest did not create a right for the conqueror to govern. Rather, Rousseau
claims that "force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey only
legitimate powers." Id.
22. Id. at 67.
23. Id. at 120.
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erned, the citizens should have a right to rescind the social con-
tract they entered into and seek refuge elsewhere if the
government takes action in conflict with the will of the people.
Turning from theory to application, the right of recission pro-
vides support for several aspects of human rights law. First, the
idea that individuals only temporarily cede the power of self-regu-
lation to a government implies that certain rights (e.g. the right to
self-determination) are inalienable. In Locke's analysis of the
right of recission he directly states that when the sovereign
abuses the trust of its citizens, they "have a right to resume their
original liberty."2 Although Locke did not write specifically about
immigration, the idea that citizens maintain a right to freedom
from abuse can be interpreted as supporting a right to escape that
abuse. The right of recission supports a right to freedom of move-
ment because in reality a group of citizens who feel mistreated by
their government cannot simply dissolve the government and
return to a state of nature. However under social contract theory
they may withdraw from the government's jurisdiction and emi-
grate from that society.
Finally, the existence of a universal right to emigrate engages
international law. When a nation prohibits a citizen from mar-
rying and starting a family or freely practicing his religion (both of
which are considered universal human rights), it acts in defiance
of international norms embracing the free exercise of these privi-
leges.22 The nation essentially says to its citizens, "we do not
honor your 'human right' to do X in this country because the only
laws that must be followed are the ones we create for ourselves."
However, international support for a right to remove oneself from
the reaches of an exploitative government provides broader pro-
tections for individual rights. From the perspective of the interna-
tional community, even if a nation does not allow its own citizens
to emigrate, other nations that do will work to protect it. There-
fore, each individual not only enjoys the rights guaranteed to him
by his own nation, but also those recognized by international law.
24. LOCKE, supra note 10, at 114.
25. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 1, at art. 16 ("Men
and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion,
have the right to marry and to found a family."): see also Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 1, at art. 18 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private,
to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.").
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Indeed, international cooperation is the bedrock of human rights
theory.
While some nations have independently recognized certain
"inalienable" rights within their borders and constructed govern-
ments based on the political theories of social contract26 or natural
law,27 progress in the universal human rights movement has his-
torically depended upon the creation of binding international
agreements. Prior to World War II and the subsequent creation of
the United Nations, individuals were subject to and protected by
the national law of their home country.28 There were some
attempts at international cooperation towards achieving long-
term peace prior to 1945, including the International Peace Con-
ference in 1899 and the failed attempt of the League of Nations
established in 1919.29 However, prior to the creation of a perma-
nent international regulatory body with the establishment of the
U.N. in 1945, there had been very little collective effort in the
realm of human rights. World War II was a turning point in the
development of international law, specifically in the human rights
movement. After witnessing the atrocities of World War II, many
formerly isolationist nations began to recognize the need for a
more integrated approach to international law." Even the United
States, which had been so strongly isolationist for the first half of
the 20th century, "appeared to have resolved that it had no inten-
tion of reverting back to its isolationism and now intended to play
an active role in global affairs."'"
26. See generally ROUSSEAU, supra note 10.
27. See generally LOCKE, supra note 10.
28. Of course there were some exceptions when a person would be subject to the
laws of more than one nation: individuals temporarily residing in foreign nations
subjected themselves to the laws of the nation in which they were located and could be
punished for crimes committed while abroad by the laws of that nation. However,
prior to the creation of international bodies regulating interaction between
independent sovereigns, "the only protection individuals had at an international level,
was through their State of nationality." CARMEN TIBURCIO, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
ALIENS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 67 (Kluwer Law International
2001).
29. History of the United Nations. http://www.un.org/aboutunlunhistory (last
visited Oct. 27, 2007).
30. Most Allied governments began to institute changes in their relations with
foreign states and created new governmental agencies, committees, and departments
to implement the new policies that would address international relations. See PAUL
GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 156 (University
of Pennsylvania 2003). Fifty-one nations then signed the United Nations Charter on
June 26, 1945. Growth in United Nations Membership, http://www.un.org/Overview/
growth.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
31. LAUREN, supa note 30, at 156. The United States made a dramatic departure
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With the formation of the United Nations and the emergence
of international cooperation through international law, "individu-
als became themselves subjects of international law, instead of
mere objects."32 International law became more than simply the
political relations between consenting countries; a "remedy to pro-
tect [individuals from all nations] was created: the law of human
rights."33 However, the progress made thus far proved to be only a
minor accomplishment: the Universal Nations Charter was signed
in 1945, but it still "lacked the teeth" necessary to enter binding
judgments and enforce compliance. Indeed, many nations who
had participated in the development of the U.N. had begun to
think twice about the idea of submitting to an international
organization charged with implementing international law; even
those charged with the drafting of the Charter at the United
Nations Conference in Dumbarton Oaks refused to include lan-
guage in the U.N. Charter that would give the organization the
ability to enforce its provisions. 4 Further developments would be
necessary to realize the promises contained with the
Declaration. 5
B. The Current Status of the Right to Emigrate
As mentioned above, the right to freedom of movement has
been openly recognized in international law. Through the collec-
tive effort of its member countries, the United Nations codified
this right in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 6 Fol-
lowing in the footsteps of the U.N., as other international organi-
zations have formed they too have included language in their
charters referencing a right to freedom of movement.
from its isolationist ways prior to WWII and even began to create organizations
dedicated to overseeing the new foreign policy approach. Those appointed to the
Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy included Sumner Welles and Cordell
Hull.
32. TIBURCIO, supra note 28, at 67.
33. Id.
34. LAUREN, supra note 30, at 161.
35. See RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAw 41-42 (Manchester University Press 1984).
36. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2.
37. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, art. 45, Official Journal of the European Community,
(Dec. 7 2000).
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The subject of emigration has even come up in bilateral trea-
ties recognizing the rights of citizens to relinquish citizenship
upon emigration to another nation.3 8 In general, most nations cur-
rently respect the right of their citizens to leave voluntarily. Since
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which allegedly believed that
"exit permits [were] not a right but a concession by the state,"39
restrictions on emigration common to the Communist bloc coun-
tries for most of the twentieth century crumbled along with the
Berlin Wall. 40 This trend has continued with most countries
granting their citizens rights of emigration that mirror the virtu-
ally unfettered right to freedom of movement contained in the
U.N. covenants.4'
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains several
provisions addressing an individual's right to freedom of move-
ment. For example, Article 13 provides a right to move freely
within the borders of a nation, and also includes a right to exit
one's home country, a privilege more commonly known as a right
to emigrate .4  The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights also includes similar provisions.43 Therefore, all the signa-
tories to the United Nations are theoretically obliged to refrain
from limiting their citizens' rights to freedom of movement. How-
ever, the extent of the Declaration's binding effect has been the
subject of debate as nations have been resistant to abrogate their
sovereignty to international norms. 4  Although the United
Nations Charter does contain an affirmative duty for members to
"take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organiza-
tion for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55"
which includes promotion of "universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion," the language of
the Declaration has been interpreted as suggestive rather than
38. See generally Immigration, U.S.-Cuba, December 14, 1984, 1984 U.S.T. LEXIS
141; Naturalization, U.S.-Portugal, May 7, 1908, 1908 U.S.T. LEXIS 97;
39. DowrY, supra note 2, at 76 (emphasis in original).
40. See Thomas Kieven, Why International Law Favors Emigration over
Immigration, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 69, 70; see also id. at 73 n.15.
41. There is some evidence to suggest that nations entering into international
conventions reformulated their laws regarding the right to emigrate so that they
would comport with international standards. See, e.g., VED P. NANDA, The Right to
Movement and Travel Abroad: Some Observations on the U.N. Deliberations, 1 DENY.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 119-20 (1971); see also LAUREN, supra note 30, at 234.
42. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, at art. 13.
43. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, at art. 12.
44. For a historical discussion of the debate surrounding the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights see LAUREN, supra note 30, at 238.
18720071
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
compulsory. 5 The United Nations responded to this problem with
the construction of subsequent documents that impose direct obli-
gations to take affirmative action. For example, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights follows the language and
structure of the Universal Declaration, but it also includes a pro-
vision requiring that "each State Party to the present covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant."46
Yet there continues to be international regulation even with-
out official U.N. regulation and enforcement. Regional organiza-
tions monitor member nations to ensure compliance with
multinational treaties addressing human rights. The Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) is an excellent example of interna-
tional collaboration. Within the Americas, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights work together to investigate human rights viola-
tions and punish violators pursuant to the Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States.47 Furthermore, the OAS has produced
the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) which serves
as the American equivalent to the U.N.'s Declaration of Human
Rights.4" The ACHR sets forth a list of "State Obligations and
Rights Protected" which correspond to those included in the U.N.
document. For example, Article 22, titled "Freedom of Movement
and Residence," recognizes a "right to leave any country freely,
including his own."49 This provision closely resembles Article 13 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
Additionally, individual nations may speak out against
human rights violators themselves. Although the United States
has been criticized for violating some terms of the Universal Dec-
45. U.N. Charter art. 56, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.
html. See also Kieven, supra note 37, at 72 n.9 ("Whether standing alone the UDHR
has the force of law is a complex question that depends on what it takes for something
to acquire the status of international law. The UDHR states that it is 'a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,' and does not expressly
require states to observe it."). Article 4 of the Charter also includes a reference to
obligations imposed on member states. U.N. Charter art. 4, available at http://www.
un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html.
46. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, at art. 2.
47. See DONNELLY, supra note 12, at 141-142.
48. American Convention on Human Rightssupra note 37.
49. Id. at art. 22.
50. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, at art. 13.
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laration of Human Rights,"1 it has almost without exception 2
honored the right to freedom of movement for those within the
U.S. and spoken out against countries which have tried to limit
their citizens' right to emigrate. The Judicial Branch of the
United States has found the right to freedom of movement within
the United States implicit in the Interstate Commerce Clause and
arguably derived from the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 3
Furthermore, the Court has recognized that this right extends
outside of the U.S. borders. In reference to the historical develop-
ment of the United States and its dependence upon immigration
and westward expansion, the Court declared:
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction,
and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage.
Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be neces-
sary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the
individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.
Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values.54
Because the right to freedom of movement is considered closely
linked with the rights of free speech and association, the Court
has rejected governmental attempts to limit the free exercise of
that right when regulation "sweeps too widely and too indiscrimi-
nately across the liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment."5
Therefore, absent a showing of rational purpose for the restriction,
the Court has rejected legislation interfering with the right to
emigrate.56
Notably, in the latter half of the twentieth century there has
been unwavering support within the executive branch for a right
51. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA(TEXAS): DEATH PENALTY/LEGAL CONCERN,
WILLIE MARCEL SHANNON, (Nov. 2, 2006), http://web.amnesty.org/libraryfIndex/
ENGAMR511672006?open&of=ENG-2AM (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
52. For examples of U.S. restriction of the right to travel see supra p. 13 and infra
note 55.
53. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941); see also Justice Douglas' and Justice Jackson's concurrences for a full
explanation of how the right to freely move within the United States is protected by
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution.
54. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).
55. See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1965).
56. Cf Zemel v. Rusk, Secretary of State, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Califano v.
Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978). Both cases demonstrate the Supreme Court's
willingness to endorse legislation restricting the right to freely exit the United States
when presented with a rational basis for the limitation. In both cases the Court was
able to distinguish between previous cases that represented an unconstitutional
burden on the right to travel and these two cases in which the government was able to
demonstrate a reasonable justification for the interference.
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to emigrate. Since 1977 the State Department has published
annual Country Reports which detail the human rights situation
in every country of the world. 57 The reports are used to expose
human rights violators and also to track the progress towards
achieving the protections promised in the United Nations Declara-
tion of Human Rights. In the reports released in March 2006, the
State Department cited various violations of the right to emigrate
in many countries, including Cuba and Venezuela.58 The State
Department mentioned numerous travel limitations imposed by
the Cuban government among the many alleged human rights vio-
lations cited in the 2006 country report for Cuba. Specifically, the
Department expressed concern that "[Cuban] law qualifies these
rights, and the government severely restricted foreign travel and
emigration."59 It reported that the Venezuelan government had
similarly restricted its citizens' right to travel by denying applica-
tions for passports and other travel documents. ° U.S. Presidents
have even openly acknowledged the right to emigrate. On Decem-
ber 10, 1985 President Ronald Reagan formally declared Decem-
ber 10th to be "Human Rights Day."6 In this proclamation,
President Reagan referred to several human rights in particular
which the United States recognized including the right to freedom
of movement.62
Individual support for the right to emigrate is echoed else-
where as well. In many parts of the world, especially in develop-
ing countries, emigration acts as a "safety valve." So long as
impoverished citizens are able to wander elsewhere in hopes of
finding a better life, the threat of internal revolt is diminished.
Interestingly, out of the 34 nations in the Western Hemisphere
listed in the State Department country reports only two were
57. See U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2005 (March 8, 2006), http://usinfo.
state.gov/dhr/Archive/2006/Mar/08-930887.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
58. U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2005: CUBA (March 8, 2006), http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61723.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2007); U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
2005: VENEZUELA (March 8, 2006), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61745.
htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
59. U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2005: CUBA (March 8, 2006), supra note 58.
60. U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2005: VENEZUELA (March 8, 2006), supra, note 58.
61. Proclamation No. 5287, 49 Fed. Reg. 48261 (Dec. 11, 1984).
62. See Id.
63. Kleven, supra note 40, at 90-91.
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reported as interfering with their citizens' right to freely emi-
grate." This seems to support the argument that developing
nations are less likely to limit freedom of movement given that
many of the 34 nations on this list that do not restrict their citi-
zens from leaving would likely be categorized as developing
countries.
A brief analysis of the emigration policies of the European
Union reveals that since the end of the Cold War nearly all Euro-
pean nations have fully endorsed the right to leave one's country,
more so in fact than they have come to a consensus on policies of
immigration." As the European Union has developed since the
Single European Act of 1986 and the subsequent Treaty of Maas-
tricht, "the elimination of internal frontiers to freedom of move-
ment [has been] the lynchpin of the evolving union within
Europe."66 However, it should be noted that encouragement for
free movement between borders has not historically been a two-
way street. Despite support for policies of free emigration reiter-
ated throughout the Cold War, and the subsequent integration of
Eastern Europeans into Western European nations in late 1989
and thereon, member nations of the EU have been "reluctant to
cede sovereignty over immigration to the European Community."
67
The European Union represents the perfect example of the emi-
gration dilemma: there is widespread support for the right to emi-
grate, but no country wants to undertake the effort necessary to
provide a home to the potential emigrant.
A comparison to U.S.-Latin American relations suggests the
same result. The United States has openly criticized restrictive
emigration policies of its southern neighbors, most notably Cuba.68
However the United States has firmly reiterated its right to pre-
vent unrestricted immigration through the symbolic measure of
constructing a wall between the U.S.-Mexican border.69 Further-
more, in recent years, the subject of immigration in general has
become a polarizing force in the United States with calls for immi-
64. See U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HuMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2005, supra note 57.
65. See generally Satvinder S. Juss, Sovereignty, Culture, and Community:
Refugee Policy and Human Rights in Europe, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 463
(1998).
66. Id. at 477.
67. Id.
68. See U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2005, supra notes 57.
69. See generally Victor Landa, Wall Along Border a Monument to Politics, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Jan. 9, 2006, at 5B.
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gration reform and growing intolerance for illegal migrants. 70
Therefore, although the U.S. has called for open borders to allow
emigrants the opportunity to leave, it is not ready to open its own
borders and welcome them in.
III. LIMITS ON EMIGRATION: SOVEREIGNTY AND
REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION
A. The U.S. Interpretation of Sovereignty
That Congress has the authority to create legislation regulat-
ing the admission of aliens is currently undisputed. Since 1889,
when the Supreme Court declared "[t]he power of exclusion of for-
eigners [to be] an incident of sovereignty belonging to the govern-
ment of the United States" 71 there have been few successful
challenges to the government's ability to control admission. The
holding in Chae Chan Ping established the plenary power doc-
trine: "constitutional immunity from judicial scrutiny of substan-
tive immigration judgments of Congress and the Executive
Branch."72 The Court concluded that the people of the United
States had delegated to Congress the power to control immigra-
tion.73 Therefore, so long as the exercise of power conforms to the
Constitution, it may create provisions restricting, or completely
excluding altogether, the entrance of any aliens.74 In addition,
Article I §8 of the U.S. Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress
to "establish a uniform Rule of naturalization."75 Furthermore, in
a long line of cases since Chae Chan Ping the Court has taken a
deferential approach when reviewing immigration statutes.76 In
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States and Fong Yue Ting v. United
States the Court reiterated its previous holding from Chae Chan
Ping: Congress and the Executive (acting through Congress's con-
stitutional delegation of power) have exclusive control over the
70. See generally Robert Kuttner, Bad Times for Immigrants, BOSTON GLOBE,
March 18, 2006, at A13; see also, Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Migration
Regulation Goes Local: The Role of States in U.S. Immigration Policy: Race, Civil
Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and
Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 295 (2002) (discussing the aftermath of the
September 11th terrorist attacks and the subsequent application of exclusion
provisions of the INA on noncitizens Arabs and Muslims).
71. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
72. Akran & Johnson, supra note 70, at 329.
73. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
74. See id.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
76. See discussion infra. pp. 17-18. See generally Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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admission of aliens to the United States. 7
B. Sovereignty and Regulation
The plenary power doctrine has afforded Congress and the
Executive branch tremendous power to regulate the admission of
aliens, and to enact far-reaching legislation affecting the rights of
citizens already inside the U.S. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the
Supreme Court upheld provisions of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act which provided for the exclusion of certain aliens who
were members of the Communist Party or adherents of subversive
ideologies." The Court rejected challenges of U.S. citizens that
exclusion of political speakers would violate their First Amend-
ment rights without even resorting to a "balancing approach." The
Court need not consider the effects of failing to grant a waiver to
Mandel so long as the Executive provides a "facially legitimate
and bona fide" reason because the plenary power doctrine provides
the Executive with the authority to make the determination of
whom to admit into the country.79
The Court further expressed its deference to the legislative
and executive branch when it allowed a seemingly arbitrary provi-
sion of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex against both permanent resident aliens
and U.S. citizens to stand in Fiallo v. Bell.80 At issue in the case
was whether INA §§ 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2), which contained
provisions relating to the admission of immigrants under family
preferences, was unconstitutional because it unfairly discrimi-
nated against illegitimate fathers.81 Holding that the statute did
not violate the Constitution, the Court once again deferred to the
wisdom of Congress.8 2 The Court found that it was not in the posi-
tion to question the legislature on this matter and assumed that
Congress "may well have given substantial weight, in adopting
the classification here challenged, to these problems of proof and
the potential for fraudulent visa applications that would have
resulted from a more generous drawing of the line."83 Although
Congress later amended INA § 101(b)(1)(D) with a clause that
77. See Nishimura Eliu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1891); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
78. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 753.
79. Id. at 769-770.
80. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 787.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 799.
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allowed illegitimate children to be claimed by their fathers provid-
ing showing of a "bona fide parent-child relationship,"84 Fiallo has
not been overturned. It stands for the continued deference that
the court gives both Congress and the Executive in matters relat-
ing to the admission of immigrants.
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY:
REFUGEES AND ASYLEES
A. International Recognition of a Duty to Accept
Refugees
The United States joined the international community in a
multinational effort to achieve peace when it became a signatory
to the United Nations Charter in 1945.85 However, it was not
until the United States ratified the Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees in 1967 that it undertook an international obligation
compromising its sovereign right to exclude.86 Article 1 of the Pro-
tocol states "The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake
to apply Articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as
hereinafter defined." Article 33 of the Convention on Refugees,
which the Protocol references, includes a duty of non-refoulment
imposing an obligation on the signatories of the Convention not to
return refugees to a nation where they may be persecuted.87
The duty of non-refoulment, or "no return", arose during the
aftermath of World War II. The Holocaust represented the ulti-
mate failure in humanitarian effort as millions of Jews seeking
refuge from the threat of Nazi Germany were turned away and
ultimately murdered in Nazi concentration camps.8 Therefore,
the adoption of an agreement that sought to ensure that interna-
tional apathy would never again result in the same atrocities was
an enormous success for the development of human rights. In
truth, the only duty the Convention actually imposed on signato-
ries as to the acceptance of refugees was contained in Article 33.
84. Immigration and Nationality Acto f 1952 § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(b)(1)(D) (2006).
85. See supra, note 29; see also, U.N. Charter, supra, note 45.
86. See Anthony Asuncion, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Establishment of a More
Liberal Asylum Standard, 37 Am. U. L. REV. 915 (1988); see also Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees art. I, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
87. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 7, at art. 33.
88. For a historical account of how the events of World War II led to the creation of
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, see Rebecca H. Gutner, A
Neglected Alternative: Toward a Workable Standard for Implementing Humanitarian
Asylum, 39 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 413, 413-418 (2006).
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However, the Convention also granted refugees who were wel-
comed into a country many rights that would allow them to nor-
malize to life in their new home.8 9 Therefore, the Convention
created a full scale plan for the long term resettlement of refugees
committed to assisting the victims of the war reestablish their
lives. Together the duty of non-refoulment and the obligation to
respect the rights of refugees settled within a sovereign territory
represented tremendous achievements in the development of
human rights in less than ten years since the end of the Second
World War.
B. U.S. Refugee & Asylum Policy
By signing the Protocol the United States bound itself to the
obligations contained in the Convention. Yet, the United States
did not fully implement Article 33 of the Convention until Con-
gress passed the 1980 Refugee Act which brought U.S. refugee
policy into conformity with the U.N. Convention." The Act pro-
vided a broader definition of "refugee" and arguably relaxed the
burden the applicant carried in proving the threat of persecution.
While previously aliens had to demonstrate either "'good reason'
to fear persecution if returned to their native lands, [or a] 'clear
probability' of persecution," the 1980 Act introduced the "well
founded fear" standard used in the U.N. Convention and codified
the duty of non-refoulment.91
The 1980 Act also included a specific provision giving the
Attorney General discretion to grant asylum to eligible applicants
under what became § 208 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.92 Conflicting interpretations within the Circuit Courts of
Appeals as to whether the 1980 Refugee Act created one standard
for both refugee status and asylum, led to the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals determination in Matter of Salim that the two forms
of relief were distinguishable. 3 The Supreme Court further elabo-
rated on the Board of Immigration Appeals' conclusion in INS v.
89. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 7, at arts. 4, 13-
28.
90. Compare Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) with Convention Relating the Status of
Refugees, supra note 7.
91. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A) (2007); see also Developments in the Law of Immigration, 96 HAv. L.
REV. 1286, 1353-1355 (1983).
92. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (2007).
93. See Matter of Salim, 18 I & N Dec. 311, 314-315 (BIA 1982).
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Stevic.9 The Court declared that "[m] eeting the definition of 'refu-
gee,' however, does not entitle the alien to asylum-the decision to
grant a particular application rests in the discretion of the Attor-
ney General under § 208(a)."95 Therefore, the 1980 Act had essen-
tially created two forms of relief for those qualifying for refugee
status as defined by the U.N. Convention. This was again
affirmed in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.96 Ultimately, the provisions
of the 1980 Refugee Act represented the advancement of human
rights law in the United States. By revising the definition of refu-
gee to that used in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, the United States made refugee status available for a
broader group of people. Furthermore, the inclusion of a specific
provision granting asylum with the opportunity of adjustment to
permanent resident status offered greater relief than the duty of
non-refoulment.97
Since the institution of the aforementioned provisions, asy-
lum statistics suggest that the United States has been the pri-
mary country accepting refugees from Latin America and the
Caribbean. Statistics from November 2004 made available by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees state that from
1980 to 2003 the United States has been responsible for the reset-
tlement of 57 percent of the 105,000 refugees from Latin America
and the Caribbean.98
V. THE POTENTIAL FOR A UNIVERSAL RIGHT TO IMMIGRATE
A. A Right to Immigrate From the Right to Emigrate
As I have demonstrated in the preceding sections of this
paper, there is a direct conflict between the right to emigrate and
a sovereign nation's right to exclude, both of which have been rec-
ognized under international law.9 9 Despite the fact that the right
to emigrate is considered a universal human right,100 most
emigrants who attempt to exercise their right to leave find few, if
any, open doors awaiting them. Instead nations quickly assert
94. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 423-24 (1983).
95. Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
96. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
97. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 §§ 208-209, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158-
1159 (2007).
98. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN LATIN-
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2 (2004), http://www.unhcr.orglcgi-bin/texis/vtx/
statistics/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=4198c2594 (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
99. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra, note 1,at art. 13.
100. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights supra, note 1.
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their sovereign right to exclude by denying that the right to emi-
grate implies a right to immigrate.1"' Therefore, the dilemma rep-
resents the archetypal conflict between the rights of the individual
versus the powers of the state. In this instance should an individ-
ual's right to freedom of movement take precedence over national
laws regulating the admission of aliens?
Current law suggests a negative response to this question.
The binding effect of human rights law is frequently debated and
agreements that interfere with a sovereign's ability to control the
entry of immigrants are even more likely to be viewed with skepti-
cism.0 2 Thus, so long as the right to exclude is held paramount to
the human right to emigrate, the potential immigrant has little
hope. However, those seeking to leave their homes and establish
a new life elsewhere should not be entirely discouraged. Because
countries have previously relinquished the right to exclude by
accepting duties under international law 10 3 there has been some
progress in the direction of acknowledging a right to immigrate. It
may be possible to give full meaning to the right to emigrate with
further cooperation in the name of human rights.
As previously stated, human rights law is founded on liberal
political theory which accepts that all men are entitled to certain
rights by virtue of their very humanity. 4 Because human rights
law presupposes that certain rights are inalienable despite
restrictions on the free exercise of those rights, it suggests that
human rights are protected by an alternate legal regime. This
regulatory regime is international law.' 5 Human rights law is
dependent upon international law because it provides the mecha-
nism to ensure that individual nations do not violate the human
rights of their citizens. Through multinational treaties countries
may enter into binding agreements that allow signatories to
supervise their neighbor's conduct and enforce compliance.' As
nations have accepted the right of their citizens to freely emigrate
via such agreements, they have submitted to international
regulation.
101. See discussion supra note 1.
102. See LAUREN, supra note 30, at 156.
103. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 7; see also infra
Section III. The duty of non refoulment as articulated in art. 33 of the Convention is
an example of such a duty.
104. See Locke, supra note 10.
105. For the link between international law and human rights law see discussion
supra Section 1. See generally LAUREN, supra note 30.
106. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
2, at art. 40.
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The simple fact that nations have voluntarily taken on affirm-
ative duties in compliance with international law is of tremendous
significance. Acceptance of the duties under the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees for example, dem-
onstrates that consenting nations have essentially waived their
right to exclude pursuant to international obligations."7 In effect,
a human right has taken precedence over a nation's right to
exclude. Thus, perhaps through further development of interna-
tional law and respect for human rights, the right to emigrate can
be expanded. There are many means by which a universal human
right to immigrate could be established; here, I will address only
two.
1. Redefining the Refugee
The most straightforward manner of resolving the immigra-
tion dilemma is to expand the right to refugee status. This could
be accomplished by expanding the definitions currently used by
immigration officials when evaluating claims from individuals for
admission as refugees. For example, under current law in the
United States an individual must demonstrate a "well founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion" to qualify
for refugee or asylee status."' One suggestion to dramatically
broaden the classification of refugee has been to rephrase the defi-
nition and incorporate the rights set forth in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. 10 9 Accordingly, "a violation of the
standards for individual rights embodied in the UDHR would
result in refugee recognition."'10 While, this would undoubtedly
represent a major victory for human rights, not only would such a
proposal likely be swiftly defeated, but the result of such a defini-
tion would be overly expansive. Given the extensive provisions
included in the Declaration and the fact that it has largely proven
107. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 7.
108. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952); see
also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1980);
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On
Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1253-66 (1990) (analyizing
U.S. refugee policy since passage of the 1980 Refugee Act).
109. Michael J. Parrish, Note, Redefining the Refugee: The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as a Basis for Refugee Protection, 22 CARDozo L. REV. 223, 257-62
(2000).
110. Id. at 258.
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to be more than the nations of the world can live up to,' reforma-
tion of the definition is arguably a more successful strategy.
A more modest proposal is expanding the definition of perse-
cution itself. Historically, asylum was considered a remedy for
persecution of political rights."2 The current definition reflects
that history with its emphasis on persecution. Therefore, it is not
applied to victims of widespread violence generally"3 or economic
suffering."' As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh District
recently reiterated in Ahmed v. Gonzalez, "[p]ersecution is not so
broad a concept as to encompass all that we regard as 'unfair,
unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.' Persecution
involves harms that go beyond mere harassment; it results from
more than simply 'unpleasant or even dangerous conditions in
[the applicant's] home country." "5 Thus, while asylum applicants
fleeing such conditions may gain the sympathy of the United
States, they will not gain admission. Rather, individuals seeking
to emigrate in order to find a better life are labeled "economic
migrants" and quickly denied refugee status.1 6 Therefore, the
millions living in countries stricken by famine or civil war"7 would
not qualify as refugees under the standard used by the majority of
countries today."'
111. A brief look at the Amnesty International website shows that virtually no
nation is immune from human rights violations. See Amnesty International, News,
http://news.amnesty.org/mavp/news.nsf/regions (last visited Oct. 27, 2007). Nearly
every nation has been cited as a human rights violator in the recent past. Id.
112. See generally Symposium, Shifting Grounds for Asylum: Female Genital
Surgery and Sexual Orientation, 29 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 467, 477-478 (1998).
113. See Alyas v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that because the
defendant failed to demonstrate that the Pakistani government was responsible for
the physical violence to his person and property, the denial of his petition for asylum
by the Board of Immigration Appeals was proper); see also Zhu v. U.S. Attorney
General, 159 Fed. Appx. 959 (2005) (holding that acts of violence committed against
an individual without specific evidence of a connection between the violence and the
exercise of a political opinion did not amount to persecution).
114. See Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
generalized anarchy and economic deprivation in the non-citizen's home country does
not provide a sufficient basis for asylum.); see also Zhu, 159 Fed. Appx. at 959.
115. Ahmed v. Gonzalez, 467 F.3d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
116. For a discussion on the problems associated with asylum adjudication,
specifically the superficial determinations as to whether an applicant is a true asylee
or mere economic migrant, see Martin, supra note 108, at 1275-89; see also DowTy,
supra note 38, at 189 (explaining U.S. policies on the resettlement of refugees of
certain nationalities).
117. See Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Harsh conditions shared
by an entire population do not amount to persecution.").
118. The current definition of refugee set forth in the Refugee Act of 1980
implemented the provisions of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and brought U.S. refugee policy in line with the current consensus on
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Such a policy seems ill-founded and deserves criticism for two
reasons. First, the development of human rights law suggests
that concern for those suffering around the world has increased
since the definition of refugee was first coined in the 1951 Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees.119 The world-wide emer-
gence of non-governmental organizations focusing on human
rights supports the validity of this statement: the fact that indi-
viduals have come together to form such watchdog organizations
is itself evidence of genuine concern. The tremendous effort under-
taken by such groups to give a face to human suffering indicates
that there is an audience to their work composed of people inter-
ested in human rights practices.2 ° Therefore, a policy that rejects
asylum and refugee applicants who seek to escape abject poverty
or anarchy in their home country seems antiquated.
As human rights law has grown to encompass non-political
rights,121 so should the definition of persecution.1 22 Perhaps it
would be appropriate to expand the definition of refugee not to
include all rights set forth in the Universal Declaration, but to
facilitate refuge for those who find themselves in civil war or eco-
nomic chaos-genuine conditions of human suffering. While such
a broad expansion of asylum policy would still not provide for an
unrestricted right to immigrate, it would be a step in the right
direction, and would give those most likely to want to immigrate
that opportunity.
The current definition of persecution is also problematic
because of inconsistencies in application. As the Convention on
the Status of Refugees does not define persecution, it allows for
differing interpretations among nations and for the state analyz-
ing the refugee or asylum claim to incorporate nationally held val-
ues when making the determination. 23  Inconsistency in
interpretation of the classifications (race, religion, nationality,
refugee determination. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 101(a)(42)(A),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1952).
119. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 7, at art. 1.
120. See generally LAUREN, supra note 30, at 275-79.
121. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1; International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/16316, 993 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976). For an analysis of U.S. policy regarding socioeconomic human rights
such as those in the Covenant, see Philip C. Aka, Analyzing U.S. Commitment to
Socioeconomic Human Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV. 417 (2006).
122. See generally Symposium, Shifting Grounds for Asylum: Female Genital
Surgery and Sexual Orientation, supra note 112, at 477-81
123. See id. at 472-73.
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membership in a social group, and political opinion)" themselves
has allowed for differing decisions as to what qualifies as persecu-
tion, even within the United States. 12 An arbitrary determination
based on a misinterpretation of the law deprives a suffering indi-
vidual of the right to refuge. A more expansive definition would
likely reduce the likelihood that deserving applicants are denied
admission.
Furthermore, such an approach could reduce the effect of
political bias when evaluating an applicant's claim. The current
practice very frequently involves analyzing the political conditions
in the applicant's home country to determine whether an individ-
ual has a well founded fear of persecution on account of race, relig-
ion, social group, or political opinion."16 Political relationships
with the country alleged to have committed the human rights vio-
lations may affect the determination of the applicant's claim. Ten-
sion between the two nations may work to the advantage of the
individual seeking refuge, whereas longstanding diplomatic rela-
tionships could make a nation hesitant to express disapproval of
its ally.
The situation faced by Haitians seeking entrance under refu-
gee status is an excellent example or political bias. The holding in
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council represented a devastating blow for
Haitians fleeing the political chaos of the early 1990s." 7 Despite
those who advanced claims of persecution on the basis of one of
the five accepted categories mentioned above, they were returned
to Haiti. 28 In contrast, their Caribbean neighbors have enjoyed
124. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2007).
125. See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on
PERSECUTION Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
505, 541-62 (1993).
126. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (holding that factual determinations as
to the severity of political conditions within the home country of the applicant are a
matter to be decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals). Furthermore, Ventura
offers insight into some of the evidence used by the BIA in evaluating the potential for
persecution. Additionally, asylum status may be terminated based on "changed
circumstances" in the asylee's country so that asylum is no longer warranted.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2)(A)
(2007).
127. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that neither the
INA nor the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees afforded Haitians
intercepted in the Caribbean Sea any protection against refoulment to Haiti).
128. See Janice D. Villiers, Closed Borders, Closed Ports: The Plight of Haitians
Seeking Political Asylum in the United States, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1995)
(discussing the discriminatory adjudication of asylum claims by Haitians and how
their applications were often times dismissed despite evidence of persecution).
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almost immediate determination of refugee status since the 1995
introduction of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.129 It is impor-
tant to note that Cubans who fail to make it to land are not auto-
matically eligible for admission either, and in some ways, this
provision therefore mirrors the decision in Sales.130 However,
unlike their Haitian counterparts, Cubans do not have the burden
of establishing a claim for asylum once on dry land.
131
Such an arbitrary determination based solely on the national-
ity of the applicant inspires doubt as to the legitimacy of the pol-
icy. Do all arriving Cubans really have claims of persecution, or is
the policy really just a reflection of U.S. discontent with Cuban
politics? While Cuba has a lengthy wrap sheet of human rights
abuses,132 it would be naive to believe that political relations with
adversaries do not enter into the refugee determination equation.
Consequently, a less politically charged approach appears war-
ranted. The United Nations Convention against Torture repre-
sents a good starting place because it provides much broader
protections than previous international agreements governing the
treatment of refugees.1 33 A policy that recognizes forms of suffer-
ing not linked to civil rights could potentially afford a much larger
group of applicants refugee status and therefore advance an inter-
national right to immigrate.
2. Integration of International Norms into National Policy
Even though advances in human rights have taken place in
the international arena these norms have frequently been
neglected in national legislation. Countries advocating on behalf
of those suffering from human rights abuses thus put forth a dual
persona: under international scrutiny they are willing to commit
to the protection of human rights, but in the national arena they
129. See Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966); see also
U.S.-Cuba Joint Statement on Migration, May 2, 1995, 6 Dep't St. Dis. 397 (1995),
available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1995/html/Dispatchv6no
19.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
130. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88.
131. See Alberto J. Perez, Comment, Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring
Controversy Between Cubans, Haitians, and the United States Immigration Policy, 28
NOVA L. REV. 437, 443-444 (2004).
132. See U.S. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2005: CUBA, supra note 58.
133. Compare Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrating Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, at art. I-III, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) art. I-II with Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 7, at art. 1, 33.
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are unwilling to undertake the reforms necessary to integrate
these norms into national policy. Support for the right to emi-
grate and assertion of the sovereign right to exclude exemplifies
this state of affairs.
In order to give full meaning to the right to emigrate, nations
must surrender the sword of the sovereign-that being the right
to restrict immigration-and move away from restrictive immi-
gration policies in favor of freedom of movement. Because there
has been significant international cooperation with respect to
human rights since the end of the Second World War, I do believe
that more human rights oriented immigration policies are also
possible. 13  However, as previously discussed, a world without
borders is still very far off. There are examples of individual
nations demonstrating national commitment towards respect for
human rights. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, emerging




The construction of the European Union represents a major
multinational effort towards cooperation under international law.
European countries have individually waived sovereign rights in
favor of the development of the European Union. 36 Although each
member is still an independent nation, the provision allowing free
immigration between EU countries runs contrary to traditional
notions of sovereignty where "border controls have always been
the essence of statehood." 37 Respect for human rights was cer-
tainly not the only motivating factor in the creation of the Euro-
pean Union, indeed the European Community's founding
document-the The Treaty of Rome-was created largely to facili-
tate the migration of laborers throughout Europe. 131 Since the cre-
ation of the European Union, it has become evident that the goal
"was not only to remove barriers to free trade and commerce and
strengthen Europe as a trading bloc in a competitive world econ-
omy. In addition, there was also a broader social and political
vision. This was the creation of an interconnected and interdepen-
134. See LAUREN, supra note 30, at 156.
135. See Wiktor Osiatynski, Rights in New Constitutions of East Central Europe, 26
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 111 (1994).
136. See generally Juss, supra note 65.
137. Id. at 480.
138. See id. at 477.
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dent European social community."139
In some ways the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) between the United States, Canada, and Mexico resem-
bles the original goals of the European Community. 14 0 Like the
Europeans, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico have entered into an
agreement to protect local economic interests through interna-
tional cooperation. Rather than advancing singular national
interests through protective tariffs, each nation has agreed to
"progressively eliminate its customs duties."141 Could further polit-
ical cooperation in the Western Hemisphere emerge from multina-
tional economic agreements such as NAFTA as it did across the
Atlantic?
The Organization of American States already provides a vehi-
cle to advance international human rights in the United States
and Latin America. Treaties already exist that provide for the
protection of human rights in member countries.' Thus, the
means are already available for the United States and Latin
America to work towards achieving a more open immigration pol-
icy similar to the one currently used by the European Union."
Therefore, the most significant impediment to achieving a more
cooperative international community is the resistance of individ-
ual nations to embrace human rights norms in their own national
immigration policies. The United States has already made immi-
gration arrangements between Cuba and Nicaragua that include
relaxed immigration restrictions on Cuban and Nicaraguan
nationals. 44 Why not extend agreements such as these to other
Latin American and Caribbean nations? Rather than using immi-
gration policies as political statements, the United States should
work towards giving real meaning to the right to emigrate by
extending less restrictive immigration policies to all its neighbors.
139. Id. at 478-79.
140. Compare North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., pmbl., Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) with Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, pmbl., opened for signature Nov. 23, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1958).
141. See NAFTA, supra note 140, at art. 302.
142. See generally American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 37.
143. See Juss, supra note 65.
144. See Cuban Adjustment Act, supra note 129; see also Nicaragua Adjustment
and Central American Relief Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 27, 823 (1998) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
3, 240, 245, 274a, 299).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Does a universal right to immigrate currently exist under
international law? The restrictive immigration policies so preva-
lent today suggest otherwise. Most countries are certainly unwill-
ing to open their borders and instead continue to assert the right
to exclude. Despite the accomplishments in human rights law in
the twentieth century, including recognition of a right to freedom
of movement, no nation has yet acknowledged a human right to
immigrate to a destination of one's choice. The right to immigrate,
however, is arguably implied from the right to emigrate-after all,
an emigrant must be headed somewhere.
The philosophy behind international law and human rights
law supports a right to freedom of movement as derived from the
right to self-determination. Nations have already made signifi-
cant concessions of state sovereignty by adopting international
agreements that regulate the treatment of refugees. Therefore,
the international community is moving in the right direction
towards expansion of the right to immigrate. Now it is simply a
matter of putting theory into practice. The main obstacle that
must be overcome is national resistance to free movement on the
basis of sovereignty. Even practical suggestions such as
expanding eligibility for refugee status depend on international
cooperation and respect for human rights over the right to
exclude. Until human rights receive the same amount of respect
as the rights of the sovereign, emigrants will be caught in the
same dilemma with a right to leave their county, but nowhere to
go.
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